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THE IMPACT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ON EARNINGS MANAGEMENT IN 
ISLAMIC AND CONVENTIONAL BANKS 
Abstract 
Purpose – This paper aims to examine the association between internal corporate governance and 
earnings management and to compare earnings management practices in Islamic banks versus 
conventional banks in the MENA region. 
Design/methodology/approach – This paper uses an unbalanced panel data of 20 Islamic banks and 100 
conventional banks, from eleven countries in the MENA region over the period 2012-2017. Discretionary 
accruals are used to measure earnings management by estimating loan loss provision. Regression 
analysis is used to test the hypotheses. 
Findings – The results indicate that Islamic banks provide fewer earnings management practices 
compared to conventional banks. Besides, the results show that among the six corporate governance 
mechanisms studied in this paper only board meetings, board size, and board independence can help 
in mitigating earnings management for conventional banks. Whereas, for the case of Islamic banks, 
corporate governance mechanisms have no impact on reducing earnings management. 
Practical implications – This paper could offer some recommendations for policymakers, regulators, and 
users of financial statements. The results of this study could assist in improving the monitoring role of 
the board of directors and understanding the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and 
earnings management. 
Originality/value – This paper contributes by investigating the effect of new mechanisms on earnings 
management, and by examining earnings management practices in Islamic banks compared to 
conventional banks in unexamined countries and periods. 
Keywords Earnings management, Earnings quality, Islamic banks, Conventional banks, Corporate 
governance mechanisms, Annual reports, MENA region. 
Paper type Research paper 
Keywords 
Earnings management, Earnings quality, Islamic banks, Conventional banks, Corporate governance 
mechanisms, Annual reports, MENA region. 






Earnings management has been receiving increasing attention after the bankruptcy of 
leading companies such as Enron and WorldCom. This bankruptcy is caused by manipulating 
financial statements, result in the loss of billions of dollars because investors rely on 
manipulated financial statements to make their decisions (Healy & Palepu, 2003). Therefore, 
earnings management is considered one of the financial reporting problems. Earnings 
management occurs when managers use the choices available to them within the boundaries of 
GAAP to manage earnings for their benefit. Consequently, earnings management practices are 
considered a threat to the reliability and credibility of financial reporting and have been stated 
by Levitt (1998) as “the numbers game”. 
A large amount of literature has addressed earnings management practices in the banking 
sector. Some of this literature found that banks tend to manage their earnings to decrease 
earnings volatility over the years (Shen & Chih, 2005). However, studies related to earnings 
management in Islamic banks are very limited and present mixed results. Some studies contend  
that the idea of earnings manipulation in Islamic banking appears to be inconsistent with the 
moral and ethical values on which Islamic banks are based (Hamdi & Zarai, 2012; Quttainah et 
al., 2013). On the other hand, other studies found that Islamic banks are similar to conventional 
banks, are challenged with information asymmetry and conflicts of interest that can prompt 
opportunistic practices that are conflicting to Islamic standards (Shamsuddin & Ismail, 2013). 
Literature also provides mixed results about the factors that may restrain earnings management 
in the banking industry. One of these factors is corporate governance mechanisms such as board 
size, board independence, and role duality. However, other important mechanisms such as 
foreign directors, female directors, and board meetings are not widely studied in the literature 
(Rahman & Bremer, 2016). 
In the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA), limited research has been done in 
the earnings management area in the banking industry (Ben Othman & Mersni, 2016). Therefore, 
this study aims to address this gap by comparing the engagement level in earnings management 
in Islamic banks and conventional banks and examining how corporate governance mechanisms 
particularly foreign directors, female directors, board meetings, board size, board independence, 
and role duality may influence earnings management in both Islamic and conventional banks for 
a sample of banks in eleven MENA region countries over the period 2012-2017. This paper 
attempts to answer the two following research questions: 
RQ1: Do Islamic banks provide different earnings management practices compared to 
conventional banks in the MENA region? 
RQ2: What is the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on earnings management of 
Islamic and conventional banks in the MENA region? 
The paper organized as follows: After the introduction, the second section gives a theoretical 
framework. Section three presents the literature review and hypotheses development. Section 
four discusses the research design and methodology. Section five devoted to statistical analysis 
and discussion of the findings. Section six provides the research conclusion, contribution, 
recommendations, limitations, and suggestions for future research. 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1 Earnings Management 
Management can utilize their information about the business to enhance the usefulness of 
financial reporting. Therefore, management practice judgment in financial reporting 
(Xiong, 2006). Although that managements’ judgment has a positive side, it additionally 
generates a possibility for management to manage financial statements in a manner that 
usually benefits them. Healy and Wahlen (1999, p. 368) state that “Earnings management 
occur when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to 
alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholder about the underlying economic 
performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported 
 
 
accounting numbers.”. This is the most common explanation of earnings management 
recognized in the relevant literature. However, Ronen and Yaari (2008) categorize earnings 
management as white, gray, or black. Beneficial (white) earnings management improves 
the transparency of financial reports; the pernicious (black) includes absolute 
misrepresentation and fraud; whereas the gray is the manipulation of financial reports 
within the boundaries of GAAP, which could be either opportunistic or efficiency-
enhancing (Ronen & Yaari, 2008). This research focuses on opportunistic earnings 
management that aims to maximize the private benefits of managers. Earnings management 
can be done by using different methods which are accrual earnings management, real 
earnings management, and classification earnings management. This study focuses on 
accrual earnings management which deals with using the manager’s discretion to change 
estimations and accounting strategies including loan loss provisions. This study uses loan 
loss provisions to measure earnings management since it is the major accrual in the banking 
sector. 
2.2 Loan Loss Provisioning in Banks 
The major accrual in the banking sector is loan loss provisions (LLPs) (Ben Othman 
& Mersni, 2014; Taktak et al., 2010). Loan loss provisions (LLPs) are a relatively major 
accrual for banks and consequently have a significant impact on earnings and regulatory 
capital of banks (Bouvatier & Lepetit, 2008). The purpose of these provisions is to adjust 
banks’ loan loss reserves to reflect expected future losses on their loan por tfolios. Bouvatier 
and Lepetit (2008) differentiate between non-discretionary and discretionary loan loss 
provisioning. Non-discretionary loan loss provisioning is intended to cover the anticipated 
losses of the loan in the loan portfolio of the bank due to changes in the bank’s business 
condition. However, discretionary accruals, as defined by Ronen and Yaari (2008, p. 372), 
are “accruals that arise from transactions made or accounting treatments chosen to manage 
earnings”. Therefore, managers use discretionary loan loss provisions to achieve private 
benefits. This study focuses on discretionary loan loss provisions since it provides managers 
with greater discretion to manipulate earnings. 
2.3 Characteristics of Islamic Banks 
Islamic banking is primarily based on the sharia regulation, which originates from 
the explanation of the Quran, Sunnah, and other secondary sources of Islamic rational (El -
Gamal, 2006). Therefore, Islamic banks have some specific characteristics in comparison 
to conventional banks. Islamic banking, by adopting Islamic sharia, concentrates more on 
moral and ethical norms in their operations instead of monetary value (Hamdi & Zarai, 
2012). Islamic banks are required to finance activities that are sharia-compliant only (Ben 
Othman & Mersni, 2014). The differentiating characteristic of Islamic banks is forbidden 
of interest (riba) (Hamdi & Zarai, 2012). The profit-sharing principle is utilized as an 
alternative to interest. Accordingly, Islamic banks progress toward becoming partners with 
depositors and shareholders, and they have to share risk with them (Farouk et al., 2012). 
The prohibiting of interest and the actuating of profit-loss sharing principle make the 
Islamic banks adopt a unique investment approach that differs from conventional banks 
(Hamdi & Zarai, 2012; Taktak et al., 2010). Based on profit-loss sharing principles, Islamic 
banks have a diverse loan portfolio that contains Mudharaba, Musharaka, Murabahah, and 
Qard al- Hassan (Ben Othman & Mersni, 2014). In general, Islamic banks face the risk of 
uncollected investments in murabaha, musharakah, or mudarabah (Hanif, 2011). 
Consequently, alike to conventional banks, Islamic banks need to absorb the expected 
possible future losses by creating an allowance for loan loss provisions (Quttainah et al., 
2013). Therefore, Islamic banks as same as conventional banks may also engage in earnings 






3. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
This section presents a critical review of the literature related to earnings management 
practices in Islamic and conventional banks and the impact of corporate governance mechanisms 
on EM practices. Based on this literature, a set of hypotheses to address the research questions 
are constructed. 
3.1 Earnings Management in Islamic Banks Vs. Conventional  Banks 
Notably, earnings manipulation in the banking sector is riskier than in other sectors. 
This is because the banking sector has a critical function in supporting economic growth, 
stability, and the welfare of society (Hamdi & Zarai, 2012; Quttainah et al., 2013). 
Literature related to earnings manipulation in the Islamic banking sector is very limited and 
provide mixed results (Ben Othman & Mersni, 2014; Quttainah et al., 2013). There are two 
different arguments regarding bank type and earnings management. The first argument, 
considers Islamic banks like conventional banks engage in earning management. Under this 
argument, the major goal of banks, regardless of Islamic banks or conventional banks, is to 
attract deposits and to use those deposits to invest and to generate profits (Zoubi & Al‐
Khazali, 2007). Thus, Hamdi and Zarai (2012) find that Islamic banks have motivations to 
manipulate earnings to prevent reporting losses and earnings diminutions to keep 
confidence in Islamic banks. Also, Islamic banks, similar to conventional banks, may 
practice earnings management to prevent violating the banking requirements such as 
achieving a specific liquidity ratio and capital adequacy ratio (Ben Othman & Mersni, 2014; 
Shen & Chih, 2005). However, the second argument, consider that Islamic banks provide 
different earnings management practices as compared to a conventional one. Islamic 
banking is established based on the article of incorporation that states that business 
operations and transactions of Islamic banks should comply with the Islamic Sharia. Islamic 
Sharia involves the thought of protecting the interest of all stakeholders (Hasan, 2009). 
Islamic ethical values maintain that the board of directors should disclose fair and reliable 
information in their bank’s financial statement to allow stakeholders to take the appropriate 
decision making and to avoid any injustice loss due to manipulating earnings. Therefore, 
Sharia act as a vital part of forming the ethical practices of managers. In this regard, 
Lassoued et al. (2018), Vania et al. (2018), and Quttainah et al. (2013) find found Islamic 
banks are less possible to exercise earnings management than conventional banks. Besides, 
Rahman et al. (2018) find that Muslim CEO and Muslim Chairman have a significant 
negative relationship with earnings management. In the same manner, Zainuldin et al. 
(2018) found that Islamic banks place higher considerations for ethical values in their 
business activities than conventional banks. Consequently, agency problems and earnings 
management in Islamic banks are likely to be less severe relative to their conventional 
counterparts. Besides, Ashraf et al. (2015) found that Islamic banks show lower indications 
of earning management than conventional banks since Islamic banks have sharia 
supervisory boards that audit the behavior of the bank and ensure the conformity of Islamic 
ethics. According to those arguments, earnings management from the Islamic banking 
perspective is immoral behavior and prohibited in Islam. Therefore, the following 
hypothesis is formulated: 
H1: There is a significant difference in earnings management practices between Islamic 
and conventional banks. 
3.2 Earnings Management and Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
Agency theory argues that corporate governance is an effective mechanism for 
mitigating management opportunistic behavior (Miller et al., 2008). This research 
focuses on some mechanisms of corporate governance that may reduce earnings 





3.2.1 Foreign members of the board of directors 
Appointing a foreign director on the board may influence the board’s capability 
to improve financial statements quality (Adams et al., 2010). There are two 
contending points of view to clarify the expected impact of foreign directors on 
earnings manipulation. On one hand, foreign directors may enhance the effectiveness 
of the board and, accordingly aid to diminish earnings management (Ruigrok et al., 
2007). The presence of foreign directors may assist in avoiding the very high range 
of cohesiveness of directors on the board by showing independent reasoning 
(Hooghiemstra et al., 2016). This will improve discussions and possibly lead to 
effective monitoring (Srinidhi et al., 2011). Adams et al. (2010) contend that the 
presence of foreign members on the board could improve and expand advisory 
abilities, monitoring skills, and observing the duty of the boards, by bringing the 
knowledge and awareness of the foreign market and as a result, decreasing earnings 
management. On the other hand, foreign directors may be less effective in their 
monitoring process for two reasons. First, foreign directors are probably less familiar 
with local regulations, governance standards, and manager’s techniques, making it 
more problematic for them to assess management choices and behaviors (Masulis et 
al., 2012). Second, language barriers may weaken the capability of the foreign 
directors to effectively contribute to debates in the board’s meeting room (Piekkari 
et al., 2015; Tenzer et al., 2014). These reasons may result in more agency issues 
between shareholders and managers that lead to more earnings management practices.  
Based on the previous discussion, the existence of foreign directors on the board 
contributes to more critical monitoring of the manager, and therefore, lower levels of 
earnings management. Consequently, the succeeding hypotheses are made: 
H2a: There is a significant negative association between the number of foreign 
directors and the level of earnings management in Islamic banks. 
H2b: There is a significant negative association between the number of foreign 
directors and the level of earnings management in conventional banks. 
3.2.2 Gender diversity 
During the past three decades, growing attention has been given to gender 
diversity1 in top positions, especially the board of directors (Adams & Ferreira, 2009).  
Examining the impact of board gender diversity on earnings management is limited, 
and the findings are mixed. One stream of literature indicates a negative relationship 
between female directors and earnings management. Based on a theoretical 
behavioral perspective, earlier studies show that women directors are more sensitive 
to moral and ethical matters in decision making (Gull et al., 2018), less tolerance to 
engage in opportunistic practices, call for a higher earnings quality from men 
managers, and assign less significance on self-interest (Krishnan & Parsons, 2008). 
Prior studies suggest that female directors have higher board meetings attendance 
than male directors (Adams & Ferreira, 2009), this assists in more accountability for 
management choices (Damak, 2018). Besides, Selahudin et al. (2018) and Nielsen 
and Huse (2010) found that females tend to deliver better control for financial 
reporting irregularities. Also, from an agency theoretical perspective, gender 
diversity decreases agency problems, mainly conflict of interest among shareholders 
and managers (Terjesen et al., 2009). More notably, Srinidhi et al. (2011) show that 
women executives enhance the environment of information through more 
concentrated oversight, which decreases information asymmetry. On the 
contrary, Osemene et al. (2018), Elghuweel et al. (2017), and Sun et al. (2011) fail to 
recognize a relationship among women directors on the board and the level of accrual-
based earnings management. Based on agency and behavioral theoretical theories, 
female executives are considered as a good corporate governance mechanism that 
prompts more earnings management reduction. The previous discussion ends in the 
below hypotheses:  
 
 
H3a: There is a significant negative association between a female director and 
earnings management in Islamic banks. 
H3b: There is a significant negative association between a female director and 
earnings management in conventional banks. 
 
3.2.3 Board meeting frequency 
Consistent with agency theory, corporate governance is important to align the 
interests of managers and shareholders by providing powerful monitoring st rategies 
and enhancing the reliability of financial information (Vafeas, 1999). One important 
perspective of corporate governance that not sufficiently explored is board 
effectiveness and commitment. The number of board meetings is a signal of board 
effectiveness and commitment (Xie et al., 2003). The lack of time to finish 
obligations and duties can be a critical weakness to the effectiveness of the board (Al-
Musali & Ku Ismail, 2015). Board meetings are the crucial mechanism for boards of 
directors to meet their corporate governance commitments, especially to control 
manager’s opportunistic behavior, and to ensure transparent and high-quality 
financial reporting and consequently reducing earnings management practices (Kent 
& Stewart, 2008). In this regard, some studies contend that the board can practice its 
supervisory role more effectively when they meet regularly (Adams & Mehran, 
2003). Moreover, Chouaibi et al. (2018) found a negative relationship between 
earnings management and board meetings. Besides, Xie et al. (2003) claim that 
earnings management issues are not considered in a board with infrequent meetings. 
In contrast, Jensen (2010) and Vafeas (1999) show that board meetings have no 
impact on board effectiveness. They propose that routine duties and responsibilities 
absorb a significant part of the meetings, limiting chances for directors to practice 
meaningful control over the managers’ team. Nevertheless, to the best of the 
researchers’ knowledge, few studies have investigated the effect of board meeting 
frequency on earnings management (Chouaibi et al., 2018). This study suggests that 
boards that meet regularly ought to offer more time in monitoring and ensuring the 
reliability of financial reporting, and subsequently, more probably to restrain earnings 
management. According to these arguments, the following hypotheses are 
formulated: 
H4a: There is a significant negative association between board meeting frequency 
and earnings management in Islamic banks. 
H4b: There is a significant negative association between board meeting frequency 
and earnings management in conventional banks. 
3.2.4 Board of directors’ size 
The board of directors is a crucial mechanism of corporate governance 
(Christensen et al., 2010). Accounting research highlights board size as a mechanism 
to reduce agency problems and assess the board’s effectiveness in reducing earnings 
management practices (Aljifri & Moustafa, 2007; Larcker et al., 2007). There are two 
points of view regarding board size and earnings management. The first point of view, 
suggests a negative association between large board size and earnings management 
(Alareeni, 2018; Alves, 2012). Large board size is an effective mechanism in 
controlling and monitoring the opportunistic behaviors of managers (Epps & Ismail, 
2009). Klein (2002) suggests that organizations with larger boards are more likely to 
have the capability to detect financial reporting irregularities. In a similar regard, 
Farag and Mallin (2019), Peasnell et al. (2005), and Berghe and Levrau (2004) 
provide evidence that a large board of directors is connected with better knowledge 
and skills that reinforcing its ability to supervise and control managers’ behaviors. In 
contrast, the second point of view, suggests a negative association between small 
board size and earnings management (Jensen, 2010).  
 
 
Small board size is more effective than large board size and consequently, they can 
decrease the opportunistic practices of managers (Andres et al., 2005). Orozco et al. 
(2018) argue that small board size is more effective in monitoring and controlling 
managers' opportunistic behavior. Besides, González and García-Meca (2014) 
demonstrated that when the number of directors is large, members of the board are 
less probable to be held accountable, thus they tend in the direction of more discretion 
in getting higher compensation (Beasley, 1996), and are more inclined to information 
asymmetry (Bergstresser & Philippon, 2006). However, other investigations do not 
find any evidence that board size has any significant relationship with the extent of 
earnings management (Osemene et al., 2018; Elghuweel et al., 2017). Based on the 
above discussions, it is expected that board size is an essential component in board 
characteristics that could have an impact on earnings manipulation behaviors. 
Though, given the mixed findings in the literature, the direction of the association 
between board size and earnings management cannot be determined. Consequently, 
the following hypotheses are formulated: 
H5a: There is a significant association between board size and earnings 
management in Islamic banks. 
H5b: There is a significant association between board size and earnings 
management in conventional banks. 
 
3.2.5 Board of directors’ independence 
The main role of the board of directors is to monitor the management team 
(Nicholson & Newton, 2010). For more effective monitoring, the board of directors 
should comprise independent directors who are expected to behave independently in 
their supervision and monitoring process (Jouber & Fakhfakh, 2011; Moscariello et 
al., 2019). Independent directors are board members who have no material 
relationship with the organization (He & Sommer, 2010). Prior literature has provided 
mixed findings concerning board composition. Some research, based on agency 
theory, supports a negative relationship between independent directors and earnings 
management (Chouaibi et al., 2018; Kolsi & Grassa, 2017; Peasnell et al., 2005). This 
stream of literature argues that the perfect solution to improve internal control within 
the organization is to have independent directors on the board. Also, the independent 
directors have an effective role in reducing conflict of interest between managers and 
shareholders as well as improving the transparency and compliance of financial 
reports (Christensen et al., 2010). Therefore, a board with a majority of independent 
directors will better oversee the managers and decrease the probability of managing 
earnings (Uzun et al., 2004). However, some studies do not recognize any association 
between independent directors and earnings management (Abdul Rahman & Haneem 
Mohamed Ali, 2006; Saleh et al., 2007). Conversely, other studies found a positive 
relationship between independent directors and earnings management (Alareeni, 
2018; Osma & Noguer, 2007). Liu (2012) and Taktak and Mbarki (2014) found that 
boards that consist of dependent directors are observed to be an effective control 
mechanism. Dependent directors have access to information that assists them to be 
more effective in assessing managers’ choices and to mitigate earnings management 
(Liu et al., 2015). After the above discussions, this paper expects that board 
independence is associated with a lower incidence of earnings management. 
Consequently, the hypotheses are as follows: 
H6a: There is a significant negative association between board independence and 
earnings management in Islamic banks. 
H6b: There is a significant negative association between board independence and 




3.2.6 Role duality 
When CEO duality occurs, there is an absence of separation between decision 
management and decision control (Krause et al., 2014). There are two streams of 
literature that studied the relationship between role duality and earnings management. 
One stream of literature supports a positive association between CEO duality and 
earnings manipulation (Ge & Kim, 2014; Nuanpradit, 2019). This stream is based on 
agency theory that contends that the chairman and the CEO should have two separate 
roles. This separation is to ensure that the CEO would not be in a position with 
excessive power over board matters to easily manipulate earnings (Klein, 2002). 
Besides, the board of directors will have less motivation to oversee the activities of 
the firm’s managers when combined leadership exists, since the leader of managers 
is also the leader of the board of directors. This may increase information asymmetry 
and consequently more earnings management practices (Wang et al., 2014). In 
contrast, the second stream of literature supports a negative association between CEO 
duality and earnings manipulations (Faleye, 2007; Weir et al., 2002). Proponents of 
the stewardship theory, argue that this role duality enhances the functioning of the 
board (Tuggle et al., 2010). Jouber and Fakhfakh (2011) find that a CEO can control 
the information to other board members effectively in a dual leadership structure. 
Moreover, Dalton (2012) and Dahya et al. (2009) argue that duality is crucial to 
achieving centralization of authority, unity of command to reduce any potential 
conflict between CEO and chairperson. On the other hand, some researcher does not 
recognize any association between CEO duality and earnings management (Alareeni, 
2018; Chouaibi et al., 2018; Bradbury et al., 2006). Based on the above arguments, 
this research assumes that the dual structure may increase earnings manipulation. 
Thus, it is hypothesized that: 
H7a: There is a significant positive association between role duality and earnings 
management in Islamic banks. 
H7b: There is a significant positive association between role duality and earnings 
management in conventional banks. 
 
4. RESEARCH DESIGN 
4.1 Population and Sample 
The population of the current study consists of 309 banks operated in eleven countries 
of the MENA region. One hundred eighty-nine banks are excluded because of data 
unavailability. Therefore, the sample of this research consists of 20 Islamic banks and 100 
conventional banks in eleven MENA region countries which are Lebanon, Bahrain, Egypt, 
Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Morocco, and 
Tunisia for six consecutive years 2012-2017. These MENA countries were chosen because 
the banking sector of these countries is well developed, efficient, and profitable (Ben 
Othman & Mersni, 2016; Quttainah et al., 2013).  
4.2 Measurement of Earnings Management 
To detect earnings management of Islamic and conventional banks in the MENA 
region, this study focuses on the accrual-based earnings management approach. More 
specifically, this research uses a major accrual in the banking sector; loan loss provisions 
(LLPs) (Ben Othman & Mersni, 2014; Taktak et al., 2010). This study follows the approach 
of Ben Othman and Mersni (2014), therefore, the basic model takes the following form: 
Loan loss provisions = Non-discretionary LLP + Discretionary LLP 
Non-Discretionary LLP is predicted by using variables demonstrating the level of 
losses in the loan portfolio since it cannot be directly observed. Similar to Ben Othman and 
Mersni (2014), the non-discretionary LLP component is expected using the beginning 
balance of non-performing loans, change in non-performing loans, and change in total 
 
 
loans. Discretionary LLP is estimated by the residual obtained from equation (1). This study 
uses the discretionary component LLP as the dependent variable, which reflects earnings 
management. Therefore, equation (1) is presented below: 
LLPit = β0 + β1 NPLit-1+ β2 ΔNPLit + β3 ΔTLit+εit                                                   (Eq. 1) 
where: 
LLPit: Total LLP for bank i at the year t, deflated by loans at the beginning of the year. 
NPLit-1: The beginning balance of the non-performing loan for bank i at the year t deflated by 
beginning loans. 
ΔNPLit: Change in the value of the non-performing loan for bank i at the year t, deflated by 
beginning loans. 
ΔTLit: Change in the value of the total loan, for bank i at the year t, deflated by beginning loans. 
β0: Regression constant. 
β1, β2, and β3: Regression coefficients. 
εit: Residuals. 
4.3 Regression model 
This study employs regression analysis to examine the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and earnings management. Besides, this study used the absolute 
value when measuring earnings management because the focus of this research was on the 
analysis of earnings management practices, regardless of whether earnings management 
practices were income-increasing or income-decreasing (Ben Othman & Mersni, 2014). 
Also, the below equation contains independent variables that show factors hypothesized to 
impact earnings management (EM) and control variables that must be held constant. The 
independent variables were chosen based on the criteria that these variables are available 
in the annual reports, and not widely studied before in the MENA region.  Therefore, 
equation (2) is presented below: 
|EMit|= β0 + β1 BANK TYPEit + β2 FOREIGN DIRECTORit + β3 FEMALE DIRECTORit + β4 
BOARD MEETINGit + β5 BOARD SIZEit + β6 BOARD INDEPENDENCEit + β7 ROLE 
DUALITYit + β8 PROFITABILITYit + β9 BANK SIZEit + β10 COUNTRYit + β11 YEARit + εit                                                                                                                                        
(Eq. 2)                                            
where: 
Dependent variable: 
|EMit|: Discretionary loss provisions for loans for bank i in year t. 
Independent variables: 
BANK TYPE: Dummy variable that takes 1 if the bank is a conventional bank, 0 if the bank is 
an Islamic bank (Ben Othman & Mersni, 2014). 
FOREIGN DIRECTOR: The number of a foreign director on the board for bank i in year t (Chiu 
et al., 2010). 
FEMALE DIRECTOR: The number of female directors on the board for bank i in year t (Nielsen 
& Huse, 2010). 
BOARD MEETING: Board meeting is measured by a number of the board meeting held during 
the year (Eluyela et al., 2018). 
BOARD SIZE: Board size for bank i at the year t, expressed as a number of board directors (Ben 
Othman & Mersni, 2016). 
 
 
BOARD INDEPENDENCE: The number of independent directors on the board for bank i in 
year t (Kolsi & Grassa, 2017). 
ROLE DUALITY: Dummy variable that takes 1 if the bank has role duality, 0 otherwise 
(Bradbury et al., 2006).  
Control variables: 
PROFITABILITY: Measured by ROA as the net income divided by total assets (Elghuweel et 
al., 2017). 
BANK SIZE: Measured as the natural logarithm of total assets (Taktak et al., 2010). 
COUNTRY: A set of country dummies used to control specific differences across countries (Ben 
Othman & Mersni, 2016). 
YEAR: A set of dummies used to control for time-specific factors (Quttainah et al., 2013). 
 
5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table (1) present descriptive statistics for the dependent variable used in this study. 
On average, in Islamic banks during the period 2012 to 2017, EM is 0.0057, and SD is 
0.00650 with a range of 0.04 as a maximum and 0.00 as a minimum. While the descriptive 
statistics for conventional banks indicate that the average and SD of EM respectively were 
found to be 0.0137 and 0.01386 with a range of 0.09 as a maximum and 0.00 as a minimum. 
Overall, the average and SD of EM for the full data set was found to be 0.0123 and 0.01326 
with a range of 0.09 as a maximum and 0.00 as a minimum. Consequently, it is worth 
mentioning that the results of the descriptive statistics of EM are not consistent between 
different types of the bank; that is the average EM for a conventional bank was higher than 
the average EM for Islamic banks; this indicates that all the sampled conventional banks in 
the selected MENA countries engaged more in earnings management than Islamic banks.  
There are six independent variables related to corporate governance mechanisms in 
this study that are foreign director, female director, board meeting, the board size, 
independent director, and role duality. From table (1), the mean level of foreign director on 
the board in Islamic banks is about 0.0588, SD 0.23629, the minimum is zero, and the 
maximum is 1 board member. However, the mean level of foreign directors on the board in 
conventional banks is around 0.6830, SD 1.25229, the minimum is zero, and the maximum 
is 7 board members. This means that conventional banks encourage the appointment of 
foreign directors more than Islamic banks. Regarding the presentation of females on the 
board, the descriptive indicates that the average and SD of females members in Islamic 
banks respectively were found to be 0.2185 and 0.43491 with a range of 2 as a maximum 
and zero as a minimum, while in conventional banks, the average and SD of females 
member was found to be 0.5666 and 0.76629 with a range of 3 as a maximum and zero as 
a minimum. This means that conventional banks and Islamic banks have a small number of 
female directors on the board. On average, in Islamic banks during the period 2012 to 2017, 
board meetings are 7.3866 and SD is 3.36258 with a range of 18 as a maximum and 3 as a 
minimum meeting. While the descriptive statistics for conventional banks indicate that the 
average and SD of board meetings respectively were found to be 6.1180 and 2.64758 with 
a range of 28 as a maximum and zero as a minimum meeting. This means that conventional 
banks and Islamic banks meet regularly. 
Besides, the average board of director’s size in Islamic banks is 9.9580 board 
members, SD 1.81983, with a minimum of 7 and a maximum of 14 board members, while 
the average board of director’s size in conventional banks is 9.9595 board  members, SD 
2.04718,  with a minimum of 6 and a maximum of 16 board members. This means that both 
conventional banks and Islamic have a similar policy regarding the number of directors on 
the board.  
 
 
The mean level of board independence in Islamic banks is around 3.5546, SD 2.77610, the 
minimum is zero, and the maximum is 10 board members. On the other hand, the mean 
level of board independence in conventional banks is around 3.0860, SD 2.55236,  the 
minimum is zero, and the maximum is 11 board members. This means that both 
conventional banks and Islamic have a similar policy regarding the number of independent 
directors on the board. Concerning leadership structure, in Islamic banks, there is a 
separation of the role of CEO and the chairman, the average and SD of role duality is zero, 
while in conventional banks the average role duality is .2799, SD 0.44934, with a minimum 
of zero in case of separation and a maximum of 1 in case the CEO is also the chairman of 
the board. This means that only conventional banks accept a dual role on the board. 
This study includes four control variables, which are profitability, bank size, 
countries include 11 different countries and years various between 6 consecutive years. 
However, the descriptive statistics in the table (1) indicate only two control variables: 
Profitability is measured by return on assets (ROA), in Islamic banks, it ranges from -0.05 
to 0.11, with a mean of 0.0108 and SD 0.01586, while in conventional banks it ranges from 
-0.07 to 8.89, with a mean of 0.0302 and SD 0.36655. This means that on average 
conventional banks in the MENA region are more profitable than Islamic banks. In addition 
to bank size which is measured as the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets, in Islamic 
banks, it ranges from USD 82,5 million to USD 91,500 million with a mean of USD 17,065 
million and SD USD 20,515 million. However, bank size in conventional banks ranges from 
USD 0.9052 million to USD 223,000 million, with a mean of USD 18,175 million and SD 
USD 27,210 million. This means that on average conventional banks and Islamic banks in 
the MENA region have a relatively same bank size. Other control variables such as 
countries and years were eliminated from the descriptive statistics analysis since they are 
measured by dummy variables. 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for all the Variables Included in the Regression Model 
Variables  
Islamic banks Conventional Banks 
Min. Max. Mean SD Min. Max. Mean SD 
Earnings management 0 0.04 0.006 0.0065 0 0.09 0.014 0.0139 
Foreign director 0 1 0.059 0.2363 0 7 0.683 1.2523 
Female director 0 2 0.219 0.4349 0 3 0.567 0.7663 
Board meeting 3 18 7.387 3.3626 0 28 6.118 2.6476 
Board size 7 14 9.958 1.8198 6 16 9.96 2.0472 
Board independence 0 10 3.555 2.7761 0 11 3.086 2.5524 
Role duality 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.28 0.4493 
Profitability -0.1 0.11 0.011 0.0159 -0.07 8.87 0.0302 0.3666 
Bank size in USD million 82,5 91,500 17,065 20,515 0.905 223,000 18,175 27,210 
 
5.2 Panel Regression Analysis 
After checking the regression assumptions, the table (2) represents the findings of the 






Table 2: Regression Model Coefficients 








B B B 
(Constant) -0.002 0.683 0.022 0.000*** 0.016 0.000*** 
Bank type - - - - 0.004 0.004*** 
Foreign 
director 
-0.003 0.276 0.000 0.445 0.000 0.276 
Female 
director 
0.002 0.285 0.000 0.546 0.001 0.299 
Board 
meeting 
0.000 0.381 -0.001 0.026** 0.000 0.041** 
Board size 0.001 0.260 0.001 0.097* 0.001 0.072* 
Board 
Independence 
0.000 0.619 -0.001 0.011** -0.001 0.017** 
Role Duality - - 0.001 0.708 0.003 0.282 
Profitability -0.077 0.092* 0.000 0.771 0.000 0.768 
Bank size 8.69275E-15 0.783 -5.92852E-14 0.007*** -5.429E-14 0.007*** 
Country 
Bahrain 
0.006 0.005*** -0.005 0.145 -0.004 0.153 
Country 
Egypt 
0.006 0.121 -0.007 0.010** -0.007 0.004*** 
Country 
Jordan 
-0.003 0.260 -0.010 0.000*** -0.011 0.000*** 
Country 
Kuwait 
- - -0.007 0.063* -0.007 0.017** 
Country 
Lebanon 
-0.005 0.213 -0.006 0.095* -0.007 0.016** 
Country 
Oman 
0.001 0.852 -0.007 0.054* -0.007 0.033** 
Country Qatar -0.002 0.286 -0.013 0.000*** -0.013 0.000*** 
Country 
Saudi Arabia 
-0.002 0.504 -0.015 0.000*** -0.013 0.000*** 
Country UAE 0.007 0.007*** -0.003 0.223 -0.003 0.223 
Year 2013 -0.001 0.436 0.001 0.562 0.001 0.689 
Year 2014 -0.002 0.378 -0.001 0.582 -0.001 0.472 
Year 2015 -0.002 0.242 -0.001 0.670 -0.001 0.497 
Year 2016 -0.001 0.622 -0.001 0.591 -0.001 0.490 
Year 2017 0.001 0.623 0.000 0.816 0.001 0.621 
Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is indicated by ***, **, and * respectively. 
 
The results report a significant positive association between bank type (being Islamic 
or conventional bank) and earnings management (p < 0.01) (Table 2). This means that 
conventional banks engage in more earnings management practices compared to Islamic 
banks; hence, H1 is supported. These results confirm the argument of agency theory that 
Islamic sharia plays an effective role in restricting the manager’s opportunistic behavior 
(Zainuldin et al., 2018). This result is consistent with that of Lassoued et al. (2018), Vania 
et al. (2018), and Quttainah et al. (2013). However, the result is inconsistent with that of 





Moreover, to test that Islamic banks differ from conventional banks in earnings 
management practices, an independent-samples T-test was applied using the absolute value 
of residual as an indicator of earnings manipulation (Islamic versus conventional). The t 
value is 9.718 resulted in a Sig. value of 0.000 (p < 0.05). Thus, the results indicate that 
Islamic banks and conventional banks differed significantly on EM practices. By examining 
the group means for this sample of subjects (Table 1), the results indicate that conventional 
banks (with a mean of 0.0137) have significantly higher EM practices than Islamic banks 
(with a mean of 0.0057). 
Also, the results indicate a non-significant association between foreign directors and 
earnings management in both Islamic and conventional banks (p > 0.10) (Table 2). This 
means that the attendance of a foreign director on the board has no impact in reducing the 
level of earnings management; hence, H2a and H2b are not supported. These results may 
be justified for two reasons. First, foreign directors are probably less familiar with local 
regulations, which weaken their ability to assess management behaviors and diminish 
earnings manipulation. The second problem is the language where local directors do not 
feel comfortable using the English language, and this is possibly going to impose heavier 
loads on foreign directors than on national directors, therefore, weaken the foreign directors 
monitoring ability to deduct earnings management. These results are consistent with that of 
Piekkari et al. (2015) and Masulis et al. (2012) while contradicting that of Ruigrok et al. 
(2007). 
Moreover, the results indicate a non-significant association between female directors 
and earnings management in both Islamic and conventional banks (p > 0.10) (Table 2). This 
means that the participation of a female director on the board has no impact in reducing the 
level of earnings management; hence, H3a and H3b are not supported. This results may 
violate the concept of agency theory in which the presence of women on boards enhances 
board independence, improve the effectiveness of the board, and improve the transparency 
and accuracy of financial reports which result in reducing earnings management.  These 
results may be justified for two reasons. First, the presence of female directors on the board 
is relatively small compared to men, this may cause a bias in the results due to the 
domination of men directors. Second, the appointment criteria of female directors in some 
of the sampled MENA region banks are based on the continuity of the family member and 
not on education and qualifications. This may reduce the effectiveness of women's role in 
restricting earnings management. The appointment of qualified women directors based on 
their academic qualifications, certifications, and experiences tend to deliver better control 
for manipulated financial reports and encourage corporate ethical values. These results are 
consistent with that of Osemene et al. (2018) and Elghuweel et al. (2017). However, this 
result is inconsistent with that of Selahudin et al. (2018) and Nielsen and Huse (2010). 
Furthermore, the results indicate a non-significant association between board meeting 
frequency and earnings management in Islamic banks (p > 0.10) (Table 2). This means that 
board meetings of the board have no impact on reducing the level of earnings management 
in the case of Islamic banking; therefore, H4a is not supported. Besides, the results indicate 
a significant negative association between board meeting frequency and earnings 
management in conventional banks (p < 0.05) (Table 2). This means that board meetings 
are a crucial mechanism for reducing the level of earnings management in conventional 
banking; hence, H4b is supported. These results are consistent with agency theory which 
argues that a number of board meetings are a signal of board effectiveness and commitment 
and gives powerful monitoring to align managers’ interest with those of shareholders and 
to enhance the reliability of financial information. These results are in line with that of 
Chouaibi et al. (2018) and Xie et al. (2003). However, the results are contradicting with 
that of Jensen (2010) and Vafeas (1999). 
Besides, the results indicate a non-significant association between the board of 
director’s size and earnings management in Islamic banks (p > 0.10) (Table 2). This means 
that the board of director’s size does not influence the level of earnings management in the 
case of Islamic banking and though H5a is not supported. Besides, the results indicate a 
 
 
significant positive association between the board of director’s size and earnings 
management in conventional banks (p < 0.10) (Table 2).  
This means that banks with larger boards are more likely to have the capability to detect 
financial reporting irregularities, and therefore H5b is supported. These results confirm the 
concept of agency theory that highlights the board size as a mechanism to reduce agency 
problems and can be used to assess the board's effectiveness in ensuring the quality of 
financial reporting. These results are consistent with that of Farag and Mallin (2019) and 
Alareeni (2018) while contradicting that of Orozco et al. (2018) and Osemene et al. (2018). 
Further, the results indicate a non-significant association between the board of 
director’s independence and earnings management in Islamic banks (p > 0.10)  (Table 2). 
This means that the board of director’s independence does not influence the level of 
earnings management in the case of Islamic banking and though H6a is not supported. 
Besides, the results indicate a significant negative association between the board of 
director’s size and earnings management in conventional banks (p < 0.05) (Table 2). This 
means that independent directors are more effective in monitoring tasks than dependent 
directors, which results in reducing the level of earnings management, and hence, H6b is 
supported. These results are consistent with agency theory, which supports the concept that 
the perfect solution to improve internal control within the organization is to have an 
independent board. These results are consistent with that of Chouaibi et al. (2018) and Kolsi 
and Grassa (2017). However, the results are inconsistent with that of Alareeni (2018) and 
Saleh et al. (2007). 
Regarding role duality, in the case of the selected Islamic banks in this research, there 
is no role duality detected. Therefore, the regression analysis fails to show any result related 
to role duality and Islamic banks (Table 2); hence, H7a is not supported. Also, the results 
indicate a non-significant association between role duality and earnings management in 
conventional banks (p > 0.10) (Table 2). This means that role duality has no impact on the 
level of earnings management in the case of conventional banking, and though H7b is not 
supported. These results are consistent with that of Alareeni (2018) and Chouaibi et al. 
(2018) while contradicting that of Nuanpradit (2019) and Faleye (2007). 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this research was to provide a comparison between Islamic banks and 
conventional banks in their practices of managing earnings and to investigate earnings 
management and its corporate governance determinations for a sample of conventional and 
Islamic banks in eleven MENA region countries including Lebanon, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, 
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Morocco, and Tunisia over the 
period 2012-2017. 
The results of this research demonstrated that Islamic banks provide fewer earnings 
management practices than conventional banks in the MENA region due to Islamic ethical 
framework and Islamic Sharia which is an effective monitoring tool in mitigating opportunistic 
behavior in managing results, thereby enhancing the quality of reported earnings.  Moreover, the 
results show that among the six corporate governance mechanisms studied in this research, only 
board meetings, the board size, and board independence can help in mitigating earnings 
management for conventional banks in the MENA region. Whereas, for the case of Islamic 
banks, corporate governance mechanisms have no impact in reducing earnings management for 
two reasons. First, earnings management is very low in Islamic banks, and the second reason is 
due to the domination of sharia law and sharia supervisory board in eliminating any unethical 
behavior such as earnings management. However, even though the research findings answer the 
two research questions, earnings management needs to be more investigated in the MENA 
region. 
This research may contribute to the existing literature by investigating the effect of three 
mechanisms which are the presence of female directors on the board, foreign members on the 
board, and the board of directors meeting frequency on earnings management in both Islamic  
 
 
and conventional banks in the MENA region. Besides, this research is one of the few studies to 
examine earnings management practices in Islamic banks compared to conventional banks in 
Lebanon, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates during the period 
range from 2012 to 2017 (Ben Othman & Mersni, 2016; Ben Othman & Mersni, 2014). 
Moreover, this study could be beneficial for regulators, shareholders, and users of 
financial statements. Regulators and shareholders could use the results of this paper to reinforce 
their monitoring strategy of the board of directors and restrict the discretionary practices of 
management. Based on the research findings, this paper provides some recommendations. First, 
regulators should force conventional banks with ethical standards that they should follow to 
limit the practice of earnings management. Second, the board of directors should encourage the 
appointment of local directors because they are more aware of local language and policies so 
they can better assess the manager’s decisions. Third, the board of directors should encourage 
the appointment of qualified women directors based on their academic qualifications, 
certifications, and experiences. Fourth, the board of directors should attempt to make frequent 
meetings. Fifth, banks should have a larger board size to empower the capability of detecting 
earnings management. Sixth, the board of directors should recommend the appointment of 
independent directors. Seventh, a board of directors that suffers from a conflict of interest 
between the CEO and the chairperson should have a dual leadership structure. 
This research has some limitations. First, this research uses a small sample size of Islamic 
banks, which may cause a bias in the results due to the domination of conventional banks.  
Second, the research excludes Algeria, Iraq, Libya, Palestine, Syria, and Yemen due to their 
political issues or the undeveloped banking sector. Therefore, the results cannot be generalized 
to all countries in the MENA region. Third, this research includes only a few banks in Morocco 
and Tunisia who publish their annual reports in English or Arabic. Thus, the results cannot be 
generalized to all banks in Morocco and Tunisia. 
This research highlights several avenues for future research. First, samples in future 
studies need to be expanded to cover more Islamic banks in the MENA region. Second, future 
studies may focus on other countries such as Algeria, Iraq, Libya, Palestine, Syria, and Yemen. 
Third, future research may examine other corporate governance mechanisms that may impact 
earnings management, for example, ownership concentration, CEO experience, CEO profession, 
board committees. 
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